ignalina nuclear power plant accident


Preparations for the construction began in 1974.

In this case two signals for activation of DAZ system (reactor shutdown) are generated: on increase of pressure in drum separators and on decrease in the coolant flow rate through the main circulation pumps. In this document the analysis of all design basis accidents (except partial breaks of pipes) is presented in sufficient details. Before construction could begin, the site […] Volume 3 Task Group 5, “Assessment of reactor cavity integrity,” Ignalina NPP Report, VATTENFALL, Visaginas, Lithuania, 1996. 0 1 1/year. Three zones have been defined by a radius up to 15, 50, and 85 meters around the reactor in the territory at Ignalina NPP (15—according to reactor dimensions, 85—according to reactor building size). Also the phenomena related to the closure of the gap between fuel channel and graphite bricks, multiple fuel channel tube rupture, and containment issues as well as implication of the external events to the Ignalina NPP safety are discussed separately. Thus if ECCS would operate according to design algorithm (reactor cooling water started to supply only after approximately 400 seconds from the beginning of accident); acceptance criteria for both fuel rod cladding and fuel channel walls temperatures in high-power channel would be exceeded (see Figure 2(b) and Figure 2(c)). In Lithuania the best estimate approach was successfully applied not only for loss of coolant accidents but also for reactor transients and accident confinement system response analyses. As a result of exposure to neutron radiation and temperature, the diameters of graphite columns gaps decrease, and fuel channel tube expands; thus, the gap between them decreases. Ignalina NPP, “In-depth safety assessment of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant,” Tech. Right from the start, when Lithuania assumed control of the Ignalina NPP, the plant, its design, and operational data have been completely open and accessible to Western experts. A public list of EC Phare projects, supporting the modernization of Ignalina NPP, is available under http://ie.jrc.ec.europa.eu/dissem/.

Below, the results of the State of the Art deterministic and probabilistic safety analyses for Ignalina NPP, developed within 1991–2007 by specialists from Lithuanian Energy Institute, are discussed. In Figure 3 is shown the behavior of the main parameters of reactor cooling circuit in case of loss of preferred electrical power supply and simultaneous failure of design reactor shutdown system. Ignalina NPP Safety Analysis Report. Ignalina NPP is the only nuclear power plant in Lithuania consisting of two units, commissioned in 1983 and 1987.

Part B (RBMK),” Final Technical Report DIMNP NT 580 (05), TACIS Project: R2.03/97, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, 2005.

Ignalina NPP is the only nuclear power plant in Lithuania consisting of two units, commissioned in 1983 and 1987.

A large number of international and local studies have been conducted to verify the operational characteristics of the Ignalina NPP and analyze its level of risk.

Also the Additional Hold-down System of the reactor is installed. Preparatory works of construction of the Ignalina NPP have been started in 1974, and the first unit of Ignalina NPP was commissioned in December 31, 1983.