Belarusian foreign policy over the last ten years or so has done away with Lukashenko’s emotionality and its ideological burden; instead, it has become more pragmatic and calculating. Belarus’s foreign policy, like public opinion, has gone through a process of emancipation and become more driven by pragmatism. All quotes delayed a minimum of 15 minutes. His efforts to break up the protest and prosecute its leaders sent Belarusian relations with the West into reverse. Lukashenko has not limited himself to establishing institutional control over the country. Skillfully playing on Moscow’s imperial ambitions, and on its reluctance to lose an ally or risk political instability in an important transit country for Russian hydrocarbon exports to Europe, Lukashenko has managed to get consistent, if not entirely uninterrupted, economic and political support from Russia. About 83 percent of Belarusians voted to preserve the Soviet Union in a 1991 referendum.11. He specializes in Belarusian foreign and domestic politics, and he has a degree in international law from Belarus State University. The search for a further agenda for EU-Belarus relations continues. But, as of now, another scenario appears more likely: a gradual weakening of Lukashenko’s power vertical as he ages. 32 “Ease of Doing Business in Belarus,” World Bank, 2018, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/belarus. 10 The Belarusian authorities are obliged to provide all candidates with a minimum level of access to broadcasting. 11 “Itogi golosovaniya na vsesoyuznom referendume o sokhranenii SSSR” [The results of voting in the All-Union referendum on the preservation of the USSR], RIA Novosti, March 17, 2011, https://ria.ru/infografika/20110317/344858037.html. The third potential threat to the survival of the Lukashenko regime is external factors, particularly those related to Russia. Belarus realized that orienting the country toward Russia alone—economically and politically—is disadvantageous. Influential security and supervisory authorities, heavy state regulation, subservient courts, and the ease with which any property could be nationalized all ensured the political loyalty of the business class. Fax: +7 495 935-8906 Every year, he performs subbotnik by volunteering with builders. 25/9 Sivtsev Vrazhek Pereulok, Bldg. According to private conversations with sources within these institutions, the ministry’s leadership has pushed quite boldly against the political screw-tightening of 2017 because this crackdown complicated Makei’s efforts to engage with the West.33. 12 “Obrascheniye s ezhegodnym Poslaniyem k belorusskomu narodu i Natsional’nomu sobraniyu” [Annual address to the Belarusian people and the National Assembly], President of Belarus, April 21, 2016, http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/aleksandr-lukashenko-21-aprelja-obratitsja-s-ezhegodnym-poslaniem-k-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-13517/. In November 2016, Rudy spoke at a forum in Minsk where he again criticized the use of coercive force against businesses and Belarus’s entire prevailing economic model, calling on his colleagues to not fear doing the same.30, Other liberals in the government operate differently. The Kremlin began presenting its bills to Lukashenko, and Russia’s new leader made allusions to Belarus’s unclear level of readiness to integrate with Russia. Notably, opposition parties and candidates have never posed a serious challenge to Lukashenko’s rule. During this period of temporary liberalization, citizens displayed greater willingness to protest, as seen in the lessened public fears of taking part in protests against a deeply unpopular 2015 decree mandating tax payments by unemployed so-called social parasites.